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Power, Promise and Problems: The
Solar Photovoltaic Industry in China
Xiangrong Liu
ince 2008, China has seized the solar-power
generation opportunity and leapfrogged into
the largest producer and user of Photovoltaic
(PV) systems in the world. In this time, its rate of PV
capacity growth has been truly astounding. According
to a China Photovoltaic Industry Alliance (CPIA)
report released in January 2016, China reached 43
Giga-Watts (GW) in cumulative installed capacity
by the end of 2015 (see Figure 1) and has more than
20% of the world’s cumulative installed capacity.
Even more remarkable is that more than one third
of this total (about 15GW) was installed within the
year 2015 alone. The emerging solar PV industry
in China is due to the three reasons: first, a rapidly
changing and booming international PV market;
second, China’s PV-targeted government policies
and incentives; and finally, the increasing demand for
clean energy (especially electricity) in China and the
need to remediate the deteriorating environment due
to pollution emissions from coal-fired power plants.
China’s decisive move

S

into photovoltaic power generation is
an intriguing example of how 21stcentury globalization works. A solution
to some of its own domestic energy
needs, PV production has thrust China
unavoidably into international markets
and the entangled politics of supply.

PV: International Markets
and Trade Wars
The emergence of China’s PV industry
has relied principally on the international market. In 2004, high-level
feed-in tariffs and other PV subsidy
policies initiated by several countries,
including Germany, stimulated private
investment in PV production all over
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the world. According to data from
International Energy Agency (IEA),
the Chinese domestic market for solar
PV installation was less than 1 GW in
2010, and 95% of PV modules produced
there were exported to countries other
than the U.S. (B. Lombardozzi, “True
Cost of Chinese Solar Panels,” www.
americanmanufacturing.org [2014]). In
2012, China exported large amounts
of solar cells and modules worth $2.8
billion, and accounted for 56% of all
PV-related imports in the U.S. China’s
large exports in this field are a result of
the country’s low cost of production,
which is itself a result of the low labor
costs and government subsidies.
The swift rise of PV exports from
China has caused concerns about
dumping in the importing countries.
Dumping is when a company exports
a product at a price lower than the
normal price it usually sells for on the
market in its own country. In 2011,
the Coalition for American Solar
Manufacturing (CASM), a coalition of
250 U.S. companies involved in solar
manufacturing and installation and led
by U.S. Solar World, filed anti-dumping and anti-subsidy duty petitions with
the U.S. Department of Commerce
(DOC) and the International Trade
Commission (ITC) in order to prompt
investigations into this misconduct.
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Figure 1. China’s Installed Capacity of Solar Electricity
Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Solar_power_in_China.
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The cases resulted in penalties of
18.32-249.96% for anti-dumping duties
and 14.70-15.97% for anti-subsidy
duties against solar cells and modules imported from China. Similarly,
EU Prosun, an industry association
of European solar PV manufacturers, filed a suit with the World Trade
Organization (WTO) in 2012. The
European Commission launched its
own dumping investigation in 2012,
which mandated that Chinese PV modules and component imports into the
European Union (EU) be subjected to
an average anti-dumping duty of 47.6%.
In addition, the EU now requires
China to commit to an import quota
and a minimum import price based on
the Bloomberg average international
price for PV modules.

China’s Solar Energy Policy
According to Bloomberg, the Chinese
government’s investment in clean
energy was $110.5 billion in 2015.
According to International Energy
Agency (IEA), in the past 20 years,
starting with the Brightness Program in
1996, China has introduced 50 energy
policies, half of which are directly
related to solar production, and the
other half to multiple renewable energy
sources in general. These policies can
be categorized into five major types:
government policy support, economic
instruments, regulatory instruments,
research development and deployment,
and information and education. The
largest category is policy support and
it includes three subcategories: strategic

In 2002, [China] initiated a
“Power Supply Plan for Rural
Areas without Electricity in the
Western Provinces and Regions,”
which promoted PV application
in remote areas.
Following these dumping investigations and repercussions, China experienced an 18% decrease in PV panel
exports, including a 62% decrease to
European markets. Although these
trade wars damaged China’s PV panel
export revenues, China remained
the leading manufacturing of PV panels
in 2012 with roughly two-thirds of
total global production. Moreover,
China’s PV manufacturers continue
to pursue moving their production
to other counties. For example, in
January 2016, Yingli, one of the
largest Chinese PV module producers, announced plans to partner with
Demeter Power to produce multicrystalline PV panels in Thailand.
4

planning, institutional creation and
general policy support. Regulatory
instruments (such as codes and standards) were introduced frequently after
2013 when China’s solar PV industry
faced another round of challenges,
including antidumping investigation and overcapacity. But there has
been very little detectable activity in
the areas of research, development
and deployment, or information and
education.
As the second largest category, economic instrument policies consist of
fiscal/financial incentives such as taxes,
feed-in tariffs, grants and subsidies.

Three policies in particular mark the
government’s commitment to the solar
PV industry. In 2002, it initiated a
“Power Supply Plan for Rural Areas
without Electricity in the Western
Provinces and Regions,” which promoted PV application in remote areas.
Incentive-based policies led to the
installation of a 4.3GW solar power station (2009-12) in northwestern China;
in the same period, another policy,
“Golden-Sun,” provided incentives
to more than 700 solar power plants,
each with 5.8GW capacity. Like most
Western countries, China also adopted
Feed-in-Tariffs (FiT)—long-term
contracts provided to renewable energy
producers, with variable rates per
kilowatt hour of energy produced (i.e.
in areas with the highest solar radiation,
the FiT is lower because the generating cost is also lower). Through these
efforts, the government’s incentivizing
has changed from “pushing” the supply
side to “pulling” the demand side.

PV in the Domestic Market
On one hand, China’s demand for
energy, especially electricity, continues
to increase. Even with the slowest rate
of growth since 1998, the electricity demand in China reached 5500
terawatt hours (TWh) in 2015. On the
other hand, the deteriorating environment due to the pollution emissions
from coal-fired power plants makes a
switch to renewable energy sources,
especially solar energy, critical to
improving living conditions. In 2014,
air pollution led to more than 200
unhealthy days due to poor air quality
in Beijing (G. Gao, “As Smog Hangs
Over Beijing,” www.pewresearch.org
[2015]). The smog in China is a severe
problem. About 60% of the country’s
power is generated from coal and
solar power is an obvious, safer alternative. Solar power generates electricity
through semiconductors and its
application can be categorized into
two types: centralized systems or
distributed systems.
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Centralized solar applications are largescale systems run by utility companies,
while decentralized applications are
photovoltaic systems installed on the
rooftops of residential buildings, business buildings – such as warehouses
and shopping malls, and in other public
areas – such as those at schools and airports. In 2015, the cumulative capacity
of centralized systems accounted for
84% of total installed capacity, while
distributed accounted for only 16%.
Both sorts of applications face significant challenges to potential expansion.
For centralized solar applications, there
are three major obstacles. First, land
use is a serious problem; to build a
solar PV plant, large areas are needed.
Regulations within China’s different
government departments vary, and
getting permission for land use is very
challenging. Also, taxes related to land
use have significantly increased the
cost of solar PV electricity generation.
Second, China’s vast geography is an
obstacle to efficient solar generation
and use. The provinces in northwestern
China have sufficient solar resources,
such as long hours of sunshine and large
spare landscapes, and a great potential

…China remained the leading
manufacturing of PV panels in
2012 with roughly two-thirds of
total global production.
to generate solar power. But transmitting it to the populous and industrial
East is the challenge. In 2015, Chinese
solar PV producers abandoned 4.65 billion KWh, or 12.62% of the country’s
solar PV installed capacity. Gangsu,
Qinghai, Xinjiang and Ningxia provinces abandoned the largest percentage
of solar electricity. The uneven geographic distribution of solar resources
and economic development is a serious
issue and the significant power loss during the transmission process renders this
business model unsustainable.
The third major obstacle for further
developing large-scale solar-powered
systems involves long waiting periods
for permission from local governments,
power-supply companies and the other
administrative departments. Numerous

projects did not receive government
subsidies on time as promised; in one
case, a group of projects experienced
a two-year delay, which increased the
generation cost and reduced the returns
on investment. These delays have had
a chilling effect for householders, who
hesitate to submit their rooftop PV system adoption applications. The adoption of solar PV systems by households
is slow. The complicated application
process, lack of knowledge of solar PV
systems, and large initial investments
are prohibitive reasons. Some cultural
reasons—such as fear of breaking away
from centralized energy systems—may
also be delaying the adoption process.

PV Supply Chain
A full understanding of China’s
PV industry requires a thorough

Distributed PV System on the Roof of an Industrial Plant, Changzhou. Author’s photo.
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Figure 2. PV Supply Chain Structure
Sources: www.microchemicals.com/products/wafers/from_the_ingot_to_finished_silicon_wafers.html;
www.utech-solar.com/en/index.html; kemiwafers.com/cells.php; solardo.eu/photovoltaik/solarmodule/.

investigation of its supply chain structure. Figure 2 illustrates the PV panel
production process. Raw materials
such as crystalline, or multicrystalline
silicon, both of which have high purity
levels of silicon, are cast into ingot and
then cut into pieces, or wafers, which
can be used to produce solar cells.
Multiple solar cells are then strung
together to make a solar module. A
solar panel includes a solar module and
a balance of systems including wiring,
invertors for transforming AC to DC,
batteries and other electronic parts.
Finally, an installer takes the solar panel
and installs it at a selected site.
The development of the Chinese solar
PV industry has faced different challenges in different periods. In 2005,
high-purity silicon and wafers were
in short supply due to the rapidly
increasing production of solar PV
panels. As a result, producers sought
to secure silicon supply through longterm contracts with silicon/wafer
suppliers using common strategies of
supply-chain management. But this
led to other problems.
Soon, the pendulum had swung too far
the other way. Over production led to
a glut of silicon, wafers and PV panels
causing a sharp drop in prices at all the
stages of production, sometime after
2008. For example, in 2015, China’s
multicrystalline production was more
than 165 thousand tons, double the
amount of 2013. Overcapacity caused
a reduction in the average price to 124

6

thousand renminbi (RMB)/ton, a
decrease of 22.6% from 2014. Because
of the low (almost zero) profit margin,
only 15 multicrystalline manufacturers survived, but the largest six of them
together have an annual capacity more
than 10 thousand tons—more than half
of the Chinese solar power market.
Overcapacity led to the price reduction
of solar modules from 36 RMB/Watt
peak capacity (Wp) ($6 USD/ Wp) in
2007 to an average of 4.04 RMB/Wp
($0.66 USD/Wp) in 2015.
With the pressure of declining rates and
the anti-dumping investigations in the
global market, many Chinese PV panel
producers and their suppliers went out
of business between 2012 and 2014
because they did not anticipate these
dramatic changes. In this field, vertical integration may potentially lead to
business failure, especially if a company
does not have sufficient resources or
the competitive advantages to operate
in the new field. Similarly, long-term
contracts can introduce inf lexibility
into supply-chain management, which
increases the risk of supply-chain interruption when the market changes. For
example, SunTech, the largest producer
of PV panels in China, was founded in
2001 and reached its peak in 2008. In
July 2006, SunTech signed a 10-year
contract (with pre-determined pricing)
with U.S.-based Monsanto Electronic
Materials Company (MEMC) to ensure
a supply of solar wafers. With the drop
of wafer prices in 2011 and the overproduction of solar panels, SunTech had
to terminate its contract with MEMC

and pay a penalty of $120 million. One
wrong purchasing decision led directly
to SunTech’s bankruptcy in 2012.
Within the last 10 years, the rapid
growth of China’s solar PV industry
has been phenomenal. The future of
solar PV industry in China is very
promising; however, developing its
solar PV sector in a healthy way still
has a long way to go. With increasing competition and regulation in
the global market and strong pressure domestically due to over capacity
and continuous price reduction, the
Chinese government and Chinese PV
panel producers have steeper hills to
climb than they did 10 years ago. But
even in the changed and changing
circumstances, solar PV remains a good
solution for China, not only to meet the
increasing demand for electricity, but
also to reduce the pollution emissions
from coal-fired power plants.
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